Endogenous non-tradable earnings and households’ demand for risky assets by Arrondel, Luc & Calvo-Pardo, Hector
 
 
 
 
Economics Division 
University of Southampton 
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK 
 
 
Discussion Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics 
 
 
 
Title: Endogenous Non-tradable Earnings and 
Households’ Demand for Risky Assets 
    
By : Luc Arrondel and Hector Calvo-Pardo (University of Southampton) 
 
No. 1414 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available on our website 
http://www.southampton.ac.uk/socsci/economics/research/papers 
 
ISSN 0966-4246 Endogenous Non-tradable Earnings and Households￿Demand for
Risky Assets￿
Luc Arrondelyand Hector Calvo-Pardoz
January 23, 2014
Abstract
Using French survey data, we explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and bor-
rowing constraints decrease households￿demand for risky assets, consistent with theoretical
predictions. A major empirical problem is the potential endogeneity bias of income risk, as
more risk averse households may simultaneously choose safer occupations and invest less in
risky assets. Even if we control for households￿risk preferences, we ￿nd that households re-
spond by increasing their stockholdings in response to earnings uncertainty but not to liquidity
constraints. We show that these empirical ￿ndings are consistent with an occupational risk-
return trade-o⁄, whereby less risk averse households choose riskier occupations and hold riskier
portfolios.
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Important puzzles have been identi￿ed in the economics and ￿nance literatures when confronting
theoretical predictions with real data (equity premium, non-participation, home bias...). Studies
using micro-data have improved our understanding (Guiso et al., 2002). In this paper, exploiting
a cross-section of French households, we explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and
borrowing constraints crowd households out from the stock market, consistent with theoretical
predictions. So far, the empirical evidence is mixed. Arrondel et al. (2010) for France, Guiso
et al. (1996) for Italy, Massa and Simonov (2006) for Sweden or Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for the US provide evidence consistent with theoretical predictions,
while Alessie et al. (2002) for The Netherlands or Arrondel and Masson (2003) for France, do
not. An important issue is how to measure income risk and the extent to which it is exogenous
(e.g. Lusardi, 1997, or Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln, 2005), as more risk averse households
may simultaneously prefer to work in safer occupations and hold more conservative portfolios. To
capture earnings uncertainty, we elicit a self-assessed measure (Guiso et al., 1996), and to control
for the potential selectivity bias, we instrument income risk and introduce the measure of aversion
to gamble on lifetime earnings proposed by Barsky et al. (1997).
Even if we control for tastes for risk, our empirical results do not support the proposition that
households who are more exposed to earnings risk choose to bear less ￿nancial risk, at odds with the
theoretical predictions of the literature on "temperance" in households￿portfolios (Kimball (1993),
Gollier and Pratt (1996)). However, they do support the negative e⁄ect of borrowing/liquidity
constraints, con￿rming that the actual or expected inability to borrow raises risk aversion. To
rationalise these apparently contradictory empirical ￿ndings, we adopt DrŁze and Modigliani￿ s
(1966) unpublished insight, according to which the choice of an occupation also has a risk-return
component, even if earnings (i.e. the proceedings of human capital) are non-tradable. Saks and
Shore (2005) ￿nd evidence in the US consistent with individuals choosing optimally their earnings
risk exposure early in their lifes. As they age however, households￿earnings become progressively
beyond their control, because of either the substantial occupational switching costs (Kambourov
and Manovskii, 2009), or the important irreversible investments undertaken both at school or on-
the-job.
We therefore extend Campbell and Viceira￿ s (2002) static constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
-Lognormal framework to obtain (approximate) analytical solutions for optimal portfolio shares and
optimal occupational risk exposures. The advantages are three-fold: (i) CRRA preferences display
the property of decreasing absolute risk aversion, which empirically explains individuals￿occupa-
tional risk exposures (Saks and Shore, 2005); (ii) in the face of a zero mean additive background
risk on earnings, CRRA preferences are su¢ cient to trigger a reduction in optimal portfolio risk ex-
1posure ("temperance") 1, which is the real trigger behind the negative e⁄ect of an uncertain future
liquidity requirement. Finally, (iii) the results can easily be extended to an intertemporal frame-
work. The main prediction is that occupational and ￿nancial risks become complements, while
preserving the negative impact of borrowing and liquidity constraints, as we observe empirically.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we brie￿ y describe the main
hypothesis under scrutiny and the corresponding basic econometric speci￿cation. In section 3 we
describe and explain the construction of the main variables. In section 4, we report the main
empirical ￿ndings while discussing their robustness. Section 5 presents the theoretical model and
discusses it in light of the empirical evidence, and ￿nally section 6 concludes.
2 The Tempering E⁄ect of Background Risk
The classical theory of portfolio choice was developed in a complete markets framework, meaning
that all individual risks could be traded. But severe informational restrictions preclude most
households from insuring their most important source of lifetime income: their human capital.
That observation motivated the reconsideration of the complete markets assumption (DrŁze and
Modigliani, 1972).
A theoretical extension to incomplete markets of the static portfolio choice model has formalized
the following common wisdom intuition: when risk averse households are confronted with a risk
beyond their control or ￿ background￿risk, they should decrease their exposure to avoidable risks in
order to adjust their desired total risk exposure (e.g. Kimball, 1993, or Gollier and Pratt, 1996).
Households observing this behavior are called temperant.2 Accordingly, those who su⁄er more from
uninsurable earnings risk should choose to be less exposed to ￿nancial risk, ceteris paribus. Also,
since income risk entails an uncertain (future) liquidity requirement, currently (or expected to be)
liquidity constrained households should hold even safer portfolios.3
These theoretical predictions can be summarized by the following reduced form equation for
the share (A=F) of risky assets (A ￿ 0) in total ￿nancial wealth (F):
A
F
= g(￿y;￿;cl;X) (1)
Where cl is the expected probability of being liquidity constrained, ￿y is the self-assessed stan-
dard deviation of earnings, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and X is a vector of covariates
that include demographics to proxy for heterogeneity in tastes (marital status, family size, gender,
urban/rural residence), household income and total net wealth as measures of their initial endow-
ment, and ￿nally variables chosen according to the theory, e.g. transaction/information costs lead
to incomplete portfolios (King and Leape, 1998), that will in turn be determined by the stock of
1Preferences are then said to be "risk-vulnerable", in Gollier and Pratt￿ s (1996) terminology.
2Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006, p. 283) have further characterized temperance as a preference for the separation
of two independent zero-mean background risks over the bundling of them.
3See Gollier (2001), ch. 18.
2￿nancial information (proxied by age, education and parents￿wealth composition).
3 Empirical Analysis
We rely here on the ￿ Patrimoine 98￿wealth survey conducted by the French National Institute of
Statistics (INSEE) on a nationally representative sample of 10,207 households, for whom detailed
information on earnings, income, wealth and socio-demographic characteristics is available.4 A part
of the questionnaire tries to give us a general idea of individuals￿degree of exposure and aversion
to risk, as subjectively perceived and assessed by them. Only 4,633 individuals (corresponding to
2,954 households) answered to these questions. Table 1 reports averages of earnings, wealth and
demographic characteristics for the total and selected samples.
(Table 1 about here)
The amount of risky assets held (A) in equation (1) is de￿ned by (i) the sum of stocks of
privatized public companies, listed shares of private companies and stocks of foreign ￿rms (direct
stockholdings), and by (ii) those held through mutual funds and managed investment accounts (in-
direct stockholdings). We exclude bonds from the risky asset category, as well as homeownership.5
20.5% of the sampled households are direct stockholders, while 30% hold risky assets either directly
or indirectly.
To construct a proxy for the subjective standard deviation of household income, we asked each
income recipient to attribute probability weights (100 points) to given intervals of 5-year-ahead real
income increases.6 The mean of the standard error of anticipated income shocks7 (between 6.2%
and 14.9% of current earnings) is of an order of magnitude similar to the estimates reported by
Guiso et al. (1996), but surprisingly low when compared to panel data estimates. 8
To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we follow Barsky et al. (1997) and infer risk preferences
from hypothetical gambles over life time income. Individuals are assumed to distaste risk and
that their preferences are in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class. The outcome is a
range measure (in four brackets) for the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient (￿). Out of the 3,483
4In Arrondel et al. (2010) we exploit data from a di⁄erent survey, the Delta-TNS 2002 survey, which only covers
a representative sample of 4,000 French households within the 35-55 age bracket.
5Arrondel and Masson (2003) argue that homeownership status in France is better explained by the ￿ ow of services
it provides, rather than by the expectation of an investment return.
6The sample average of expected income growth (around 1.5%) is roughly consistent with French time series
evidence for the preceding period (around 1.8% over 1990-98).
7Assuming that ￿ve years ahead expected real income is yt+5 = (1+g)yt; the formula for the anticipated standard
deviation of household income is StdDev(yt+5) ￿ ￿y = yt￿g; where yt is current real income, g is the expected
growth rate of real income, and ￿g its standard deviation. In Appendix 2, Table A.2, the frequency distribution
for the standard deviation to income ratio ￿y=yt (when ￿50% bounds are used) shows that 41% of the households
hold point expectations. Only 8% display a ratio above 15% of current earnings. Although we chose the units-free
standard deviation measure of earnings uncertainty, our results remain unchanged when we replace it by the variance
or by the standard deviation to income ratio (￿y=yt).
8The gap between both is commonly explained by (i) overestimation of true "uncertainty" in econometric regres-
sions (Dominitz, 2001), (ii) neglected within interval variation, (iii) underreporting of the probability of very low
income events, and/or (iv) measurement error in survey responses. See Guiso et al. (1996) or Lusardi (1997) for
additional details.
3respondents, 43.1% are very risk averse (￿ ￿ 3:76) and 39.4% are highly so (3:76 > ￿ ￿ 2).
11.2% display moderate risk aversion (2 > ￿ ￿ 1) while only 6.3% quali￿ed as low risk averse
(1 > ￿).9 Controlling for demographic and economic factors, those who are more risk tolerant
are also more willing to take risk in ￿nancial decisions and more likely to become self-employed
(excluding farmers).10
Finally, to capture households￿ability to gain access to credit markets, two questions in the
survey identify both ￿ discouraged borrowers￿ and ￿ turned down applicants￿ . The variable that
proxies for liquidity constraints takes value one if households quali￿ed themselves in either category.
11,7% of the surveyed households are liquidity constrained (346 out of 2954).
4 Econometric Results
To estimate the demand for risky assets as in model (1), a two-stage decision process is assumed.
Households choose ￿rst whether or not to hold risky assets (a Probit model is used) and then
they decide how to allocate total ￿nancial wealth between safe and risky assets. Conditional on
participation, the second stage estimates the fraction of ￿nancial wealth invested in risky assets
(conditional asset share), introducing the inverse Mills ratio to correct for the selectivity bias.
Economic theory predicts that di⁄erent sets of explanatory variables explain the di⁄erent stages,
e.g. King and Leape (1998) argue that information costs explain essentially the decision to enter
the stock market. Accordingly we introduce education and the presence of risky assets in parents￿
wealth only in the Probit model.11
(Table 2a about here)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2a report the two-step estimation results for the narrowest de￿nition
of risky assets (direct stockholdings). Stock of information variables increase the probability of
risky asset ownership: Households whose parents owned stocks are about 11.2 percentage points
more likely to hold stocks directly. A second-order polynomial in age con￿rms that the probability
of stockownership attains its minimum for young households, increasing through the life cycle to
reach a maximum at the age of 46.
Income and net worth induce stock market participation, consistent with the presence of ￿xed
transaction costs (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) and/or risk preferences decreasing in wealth (DARA).
Households who expect to be liquidity constrained are less likely to invest in risky assets.12 Moving
a household from the 10th to the 90th percentile of probability to be deterred from applying for
credit in the future reduces the probability of stockownership by 8,5 percentage points.
Contrary to economic theory predictions, the coe¢ cient of the expected standard deviation of
9Sahm (2007) or Chiappori and Paiella (2008) use panel data to con￿rm that relative risk aversion is constant in
both the American HRS and the Italian SHIW, respectively.
10In Appendix 1, Table A.3 we show that Barsky et al.￿ s (1997) measure of relative risk aversion predicts earnings
risk exposure or prudence in ￿nancial attitudes,
11When we introduce past gains and/or losses in the stock exchange and a proxy for the quality of portfolio
management in the conditional demand equation as additional exclusion restrictions, the results remain unchanged.
12To avoid endogeneity issues, we included the predicted probability of being liquidity constrained.
4earnings in the Probit equation is positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10-percent level.
Households who anticipate lower earnings risk invest less in risky assets: those who reported no
risk on earnings were about 2.7 percentage points less likely to hold stocks directly than those in
the highest earnings risk decile, ceteris paribus. Consistent with the results of King and Leape
(1998), the conditional asset demand equation (Table 2a, column 2) is poorly explained. When we
estimate a simple Tobit model for the share of risky assets, the results below column 3 of Table 2a
con￿rm that the income risk coe¢ cient is always positive.
(Table 2b about here)
Since only a small fraction of households report positive amounts of risky assets, we have also
explored the sensitivity of the results to a broader de￿nition of risky assets (direct or indirect
stockholding) for both the two-step and Tobit estimations (Table 2a, columns 4 and 5, and 6,
respectively). For most variables, the estimates are similar to those obtained with the narrow def-
inition, although the e⁄ects appear statistically stronger. Since 5-year-ahead real income increases
are unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, Table 2a contains the results when ￿50%
bounds are used. Because households￿￿nancial behaviour has been found to be sensible to the size
of income shocks (Carroll, 1997), Table 2b reports our estimation results when ￿100% bounds are
imposed instead. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.13
To control for households who, being more risk averse, may have self-selected into safer jobs
we: (i) have introduced Barsky et al.￿ s (1997) individual measure of aversion to gamble on life
time earnings, and we (ii) instrumented the earnings variance by a qualitative variable capturing
the frequency and severity of ￿nancial distress at home while young14. We also included in the
instrument set the own subjective probability of unemployment, past own health problems and own
subjective transition probability to self-employment as well as di⁄erent proxies for social status and
portfolio composition of the household head￿ s parents. The positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of income
risk on either de￿nition of stockholdings remains.
(Table 3 about here)
Following Wooldridge (2002), we ￿rst tested the exogeneity of the earnings variance in the
discrete choice equation by 2SLS. Given that we could not reject the null, we tested exogeneity
in the conditional demand equation under the null in the participation equation. Although the
predicted power of the ￿rst stage regression is low (the F statistic is only slightly above 2), the
t-statistics in the demand equations (reported as chi square statistics in Table 3) do not allow us to
reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in either the two-step or in the Tobit speci￿cations. Therefore,
the non-instrumented model is preferred as long as the instruments are valid, which is the case.
13Unreported results show that when we restrict the sample to households with an active head, the e⁄ect of income
risk is even stronger: households who have no risk on their earnings were about 5.6 percentage points less likely to
hold stocks directly than those in the highest earnings risk decile.
14Although there is a statistically signi￿cant positive correlation between the instrument and Barsky et al.￿ s (1997)
measure of risk aversion (LR test statistic = 9:8;P = 0:0441), to the extent that the latter is also included separately
in the two-stage regression, the potential endogeneity caused by an interegenerational transmission of risk preferences
(Kimball et al., 2009) is not an issue.
55 A Theoretical Explanation
The empirical results provide mixed support to households rebalancing their stockholdings away
from risky assets to compensate for their exposure to uninsurable income risk. On one hand,
liquidity constrained households e⁄ectively hold less risky assets. On the other hand, households
who are more exposed to earnings risk appear to invest more in risky assets, against theoretical
predictions.
These apparently contradictory ￿ndings can be rationalised if households do actually choose
their occupations also as a function of the risk embedded in life-cycle earnings pro￿les (Palacios-
Huerta, 2003; Saks and Shore, 2005; Sahm, 2007). 15 The choice of an occupation corresponds
then to an optimal earnings risk exposure. However, as they age, the risk on earnings becomes
progressively beyond their control, or a background risk. Households ￿nd themselves "locked-
in" either because of the irreversible nature of human capital investments (at school or on the
job) or because of the considerable costs associated with switching occupations (Kambourov and
Manovskii, 2009). If preferences towards risk are invariant through the life-cycle, cross-sectional
data on portfolios and earnings risk should then reveal that more risk averse households hold both
more conservative portfolios and safer occupations. This is precisely what DrŁze and Modigliani
(1966) claimed in an unpublished extension of their famous article (DrŁze and Modigliani, 1972).
(16)
Here, we capture their insight within Campbell and Viceira￿ s (2002) static CRRA-Lognormal
framework, extending it to obtain an (approximate) analytical solution with three main advantages:
(i) the main e⁄ects of interest become apparent, and the conclusions can be easily extended to an
intertemporal framework; (ii) we do not need to resort to an intertemporal framework to capture
the impact of decreasing risk aversion on occupational choice, empirically identi￿ed by Saks and
Shore (2005); and (iii) CRRA preferences belong to the broader class of HARA functions, for which
Gollier and Pratt (1996) show that individuals exposed to a zero mean additive background risk
will optimally choose to invest less in risky assets ("temperance"). In what follows, upper case
letters are used for the variables of interest, while lower case letters denote the natural logarithms
of them.
The problem a household faces is how to invest her initial ￿nancial wealth holdings, W0; when
there are only two assets available: a risky asset promising to deliver tomorrow a random return ￿
1 + e R
￿
and a riskless asset promising the delivery of a sure return (1 + R): Her individual objective
function is a continuous, di⁄erentiable representation of her preferences that admit an expected
15A di⁄erent explanation relies on the intertemporal e⁄ect of background risk, examined by Elmendorf and Kimball
(2000). They show that a background risk on earnings will also trigger a precautionary increase in savings, part of
which will be optimally invested in risky assets by decreasingly risk averse households. Haliassos and Michaelides
(2002) provide an in-depth discussion of this mechanism, and calibrate a realistic model of household portfolios using
data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances.
16Quoting them: "... de telle sorte que le consommateur exer￿ant une activitØ plus alØatoire (par choix) aura
Øgalement des placements plus risquØs (...). C￿ est le sens de notre proposition [6.6, p. 29]."
6utility form over ￿nal consumption,
e C = W0(1 + e Rp) + e Ye; (2)
where e Ye represents uninsurable endogenous earnings. Household earnings come from the inelastic
supply of one unit of time, T = 1; which can be optimally allocated between a relatively ￿ riskless
occupation￿and a relatively ￿ risky￿one. If we denote by ￿ the fraction of available time invested in
the risky occupation, ￿e I are the corresponding earnings, and (1 ￿ ￿)I the earnings from the time
devoted to the safe occupation. Then labour earnings are expressed as:
e Ye = (1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿e I = I[1 + ￿(
e I
I
￿ 1)] : (3)
e I = I expfs + e ￿g;e ￿ ￿ N(￿
1
2
￿2
￿;￿2
￿) s > 0 (4)
Denoting by ￿ the share of initial wealth invested in the risky asset, the portfolio return is
e Rp = ￿e R + (1 ￿ ￿)R. Assuming that household preferences are in the constant relative risk
aversion class (CRRA), u(w) = w1￿￿
1￿￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿
wu00(w)
u0(w) , and that earnings and portfolio returns are
statistically independent, we can write the solution to her individual optimization problem as 17:
￿DM =
1
￿e
￿
Ee z
￿￿2
z
￿
(5)
￿DM =
1
1 ￿ ￿e
￿
s
￿￿2
￿
￿
(6)
Where 1
￿e ￿ 1+
Ee Ye expf￿ 1
2￿2
yg
expfEe rp+w0g is the inverse elasticity of ￿nal consumption with respect to ￿nancial
wealth, or equivalently, it is the ratio of average total wealth (human and non-human) to average
￿nancial wealth, 1
￿e ￿ W+Y e
W = 1 + Y e
W . Correspondingly, 1
1￿￿e denotes the inverse elasticity of of
￿nal consumption with respect to human wealth. Ee z ￿ log
E[1+e R]
[1+R] denotes the log expected excess
returns and ￿2
z their variance. Finally, s ￿ log Ee I
I is the log expected excess earnings, and ￿2
￿ the
corresponding variance. Several remarks follow, mostly on (6):
Remark 1: s > 0 denotes the risk premium required by the household in order to devote a
positive fraction of its time to the risky occupation. Evidence of such a risk premium has been
recently found by Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006). 18
Remark 2: 1
1￿￿e captures two e⁄ects, ceteris paribus: (i) households endowed with more non-
human initial wealth devote more time to the risky occupation, obtaining higher expected earnings
17Campbell and Viceira￿ s (2002) log-linear approximate solution method proceeds in three steps. First, the budget
constraint and the Euler equations are replaced for log-linear second order Taylor approximations around the ￿xed
point solution. Second, it looks for optimal portfolio and job allocations that verify the log-linear equations. Finally,
it identi￿es the coe¢ cients of the optimal allocations using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. A complete
derivation for the general case in which portfolio returns and earnings are correlated, can be found in Appendix 2.
18Using a large Danish panel data set on labour incomes, they ￿nd that "...individuals require an increase of about
25 percent in their starting labour income in order to be willing to accept an increase in the variance of the permanent
shock from its 25th percentile to its 75th percentile".
7since s > 0. This is the non-human wealth e⁄ect empirically identi￿ed by Saks and Shore (2005);
(ii) it also measures indirectly the extent to which the non-tradability of human capital matters
for stockholdings. If ￿nal consumption is essentially ￿nanced by ￿nancial wealth (value of ￿e close
to 1), the stockholder will behave as if markets were e⁄ectively complete. Conversely, if ￿nal
consumption is essentially ￿nanced out of human wealth (value of ￿e close to 0), the stockholder
will invest agressively in risky assets to take advantage of the positive portfolio return, while taking
a more conservative strategy in choosing the time devoted to the risky occupation. The e⁄ect of ￿e
on stockholdings is absent if human capital is tradable, for then (under independence) the optimal
portfolio share is the myopic solution19 :
￿￿ =
Ee z
￿￿2
z
(7)
￿￿ =
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
s
￿￿2
i
￿
(8)
Interestingly, the optimal occupational risk exposure is also weighted by the inverse elasticity
of consumption to human wealth, 1
1￿￿ ￿ 1 +
expfw0g
expEe ye ; suggesting that the e⁄ect identi￿ed by Saks
and Shore (2005) is also at work even when human capital is tradable20.
Remark 3: More risk averse households (higher ￿) rationally choose both safer occupations (6)
and more conservative portfolios (5), ceteris paribus. This is what the next proposition formalizes:
Proposition 1 When portfolio returns and labour earnings are independently distributed, both risks
are complements even if earnings are non-tradable: d￿DM
d￿DM > 0:
Proof. See appendix 2. (21)
Hence across occupations, di⁄erences in risky asset demands are positively correlated with dif-
ferences in non-diversi￿able earnings risk.
Remark 4: However, within occupations (holding ￿DM ￿xed) individuals display a temperant
reaction to earnings uncertainty. If investments in human capital are sunk, non-tradable and
the costs associated with switching occupations are considerable, earnings become e⁄ectively a
background risk (￿DM ￿xed) as households age. Since CRRA preferences are in the HARA class,
19When we allow for an endogenous choice of earnings risk, and that risk can be traded, the budget constraint of
the household becomes:
e C =
￿
W0 + e Ye
￿
(1 + e Rp)
and CRRA preferences together with portfolio returns and earnings being independent joint lognormally distributed
guarantee that the "myopic" portfolio share is optimal. See Appendix 2 for a proof.
20When human capital is endogenous and tradable, the term
1
1￿￿ captures an allocational imbalance in terms of
human versus non-human wealth: if the household only has human wealth to ￿nance consumption, it will still hold
the myopic optimal portfolio share but will ceteris paribus choose a safer occupation than a household endowed
with a very large non-human to human wealth ratio. Hence, it is not because human capital is non tradable that
richer households choose high-risk high-return professions in terms of earnings, it is simply because being richer, their
consumption depends less on earnings risk (DARA e⁄ect).
21Proceeding instead as Campbell and Viceira (2002, p.173) do (on the basis of the log-linearized ￿rst order Taylor
expansion of endogenous earnings), one can ￿nd a su¢ cient condition that depends on the relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient ￿; i.e. if ￿ ￿
1
1￿￿e then
d￿DM
d￿DM > 0:
8the temperant e⁄ect of a background risk on the optimal portfolio share (5) can be understood by
decomposing the di⁄erence relative to the optimal portfolio share when markets are complete, (7)
:22
￿DM ￿ ￿￿ =
￿
1
￿e
￿
Ee z
￿2
z￿
￿
Ee z
￿2
z￿
(9)
=
￿
1
￿e
￿
1
￿
￿
Ee z
￿2
z￿
| {z }
(-) Risk Substitution E⁄ect (RSE)
+
￿
1
￿
￿ 1
￿
Ee z
￿2
z￿
| {z }
(+) Income E⁄ect (IE)
(10)
where 1 < 1
￿e ￿ 1+
Ee Ye expf￿ 1
2￿2
yg
expfEe rp+w0g < 1
￿ ￿ 1+ Ee Ye
expfEe rp+w0g; since ￿2
y > 0 means that exp
￿
￿1
2￿2
y
￿
< 1:
The equality from (9) to (10) follows from adding and subtracting the optimal portfolio 1
￿
Ee z
￿2
z￿
of a household with certain but non-tradable labour income y = Ee Ye: The ￿rst additive term
in (10) captures the negative e⁄ect on the complete markets optimal share ￿￿ of introducing an
independent zero-mean background risk e " ￿ e Ye ￿ y : Ee " = 0 (risk-vulnerable reaction, in Gollier
and Pratt￿ s, 1996, terminology). The second term in (10) captures the positive e⁄ect on ￿￿ of
introducing a degenerate independent background risk that assigns probability 1 to its positive
mean Ee Ye = y > 0; and zero elsewhere. Since CRRA preferences display decreasing absolute risk
aversion, richer households are more willing to invest in stocks23.
Empirical Implication.
Because the variance of log-labour earnings is an increasing function of the optimal occupational
risk exposure,
d￿2
y
d￿DM > 0;8￿DM 2 (0;1) (24), Proposition 1 implies that those households who are
more exposed to earnings risk should also invest more in risky assets:
￿i
DM1fi:￿2
y;i>med￿2
yg ￿ ￿i
DM1fi:￿2
y;i￿med￿2
yg > 0 (11)
where med￿2
y denotes the median value of the variance of log-earnings,
R med￿2
y
0 dF(￿2
y) = :5; and is
used as a bechmark.
Inserting (10) into (11), the e⁄ect of earnings uncertainty both within and across occupations
22In Arrondel et al. (2010) we adopt this same decomposition to study the tempering e⁄ect of a correlated back-
ground risk. Here instead, we assume that it is independently distributed of stock market risk, because the survey
question exploited there (Delta-TNS 2002 survey) is unavailable in the data set exploited here (INSEE-Patrimoine
1998 survey).
23Campbell and Viceira (2002, pp. 172-3) examine instead the e⁄ect of a mean-preserving increase in log-labour
earnings uncertainty (￿
2
y) on the optimal allocation to risky assets. Since our model coincides with theirs when the
optimal level of exposure to earnings uncertainty is exogenous (￿DM ￿xed), the condition to observe a temperant
reaction is the same: Only su¢ ciently risk averse individuals (￿ ￿
1
￿e) will tilt their portfolios away from risky assets
when enduring a mean-preserving increase in earnings uncertainty,
d￿DM
d￿2
y < 0: If however we examine the overall
e⁄ect of a mean-preserving increase in log-labour earnings uncertainty (￿
2
y) on the optimal allocation to risky assets
when ￿DM is endogenous, even su¢ ciently risk averse individuals (￿ ￿
1
￿e) will tilt their portfolios ambiguously,
d￿DM
d￿2
y 7 0: The reason is that they are now allowed to switch occupations (choose a safer job) to compensate for the
increase in earnings risk. A proof is available upon request.
24Explicit expressions for ￿
2
y and
d￿2
y
d￿ can be found in Appendix 2, proof of Proposition 1 part (1.i).
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(12)
Hence, to properly identify a temperant reaction empirically, we need to identify occupations within
which life-cycle earnings risk is relatively homogeneous since individuals self-select into them as a
function of their risk preferences. Expression (12) then suggests to: (i) classify occupations in
terms of their life-cycle earnings variance (or another measure of life-cycle earnings risk)25, de￿ning
categorical occupational risk variables for each; (ii) within each category, ￿nd the median value
of the earnings variance and de￿ne a second set of categorical variables, taking value 1 for those
who have an earnings variance above the (within occupation risk) median; and ￿nally, (iii) interact
the two sets of categorical variables with the variance of earnings. The estimated coe¢ cients for
the interactions are predicted to be negative, i.e. the "(-) RSE: Temperant reaction" terms in
(12), and their joint signi￿cance measures the added-up strenght of a temperant reaction within
each occupation26. If the categorical occupational variables are also introduced by themselves
(not interacted), and the less risky occupational category is used as reference, expression (12)
predicts that the estimated dummy coe¢ cients should be jointly signi￿cant and positive, i.e. the
"(+) ACROSS occupations: Self-selection" term in (12) captures the degree of complementarity
between earnings and portfolio risks. Although with the available cross-sectional survey data we
cannot disentangle both, notice that according to it, the importance of earnings risk may have been
seriously underestimated because of the two con￿ icting e⁄ects.
6 Conclusion
While the theory of temperant portfolio choice predicts a negative impact of uninsurable risks on
the demand for risky assets, its empirical evaluation is quite a di¢ cult task. Using a comparable
methodology to Guiso et al. (1996), our empirical results do not support the proposition that
income risk depresses households￿demand for stocks in France even if we are able to control for
di⁄erences in risk preferences, and for the potential endogeneity of the self-assessed income risk
variable. But liquidity constraints are found to have an empirically sizeable negative impact.
25This has recently been done by Saks and Shore (2005) and Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) for the US and
Denmark, respectively.
26If the size of the di⁄erent occupational risks are compensated by di⁄erences in mean earnings as Nielsen and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) suggest, then the income e⁄ect ("(+)IE" term in expression (12)) within occupations should
be negligible in size and could be empirically ignored.
10To rationalize these apparently contradictory ￿ndings, a theoretical explanation consistent with
restrictions on preferences su¢ cient to trigger temperant portfolio rebalancing in the presence of
a background risk is advanced, the origins of which date back to DrŁze and Modigliani￿ s (1966)
unpublished work. When occupations can be characterized in terms of the riskiness in the associ-
ated life-cycle earnings pro￿les, individuals with di⁄erent preferences for risk are going to self-select
into them accordingly. Since the same risk preferences govern their ￿nancial decisions, more risk
averse individuals are going to hold both safer occupations and more conservative portfolios. When
switching occupations is very costly, and important irreversible investments are undertaken both
at school or on the job, as individuals age they loose their ability to choose the optimal degree
of occupational risk exposure, which e⁄ectively becomes a background risk. Hence, across occu-
pations, individuals more exposed to earnings risk are also going to hold riskier portfolios, but to
the extent that preferences satisfy the su¢ cient conditions to observe a temperant reaction, within
occupations, individuals who are more exposed to earnings risk are also going to hold more conser-
vative portfolios. To the extent that households choose their occupations early in their lives, and
that information at that stage is at best incomplete, unanticipated income shocks in mid- or late
stages of their life-cycles are likely to trigger a temperant reaction across occupations. The e⁄ect
is re-inforced both by the sunk investments undertaken either at school or on-the-job, as well as
by the substantial costs to switch (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) towards occupations carrying
less earnings risk at the expense of a lower mean.The latter is what drives the negative e⁄ect of
borrowing/liquidity constraints on ￿nancial risk exposure, empirically detected.
Being empirically di¢ cult to disentangle both con￿ icting e⁄ects of earnings risk when exploiting
the cross-sectional variation, it is likely that the actual magnitude of the negative impact of earnings
uncertainty on households￿portfolios has been underestimated. Age-speci￿c group studies, like
Lusardi (1998)27, or realistically calibrated quantitative macroeconomic studies, like Benzoni et
al. (2007)28, point in that direction. Although here we have only examined the implications of a
risk-return trade-o⁄ in occupational choice within a static portfolio choice model, its extension to
an intertemporal dynamic framework promises fruitful future research.
7 References
Alessie, R., Hochguertel, S. and van Soest, A., 2001. ￿ Household Portfolios in The Netherlands,￿
in Household Portfolios, Guiso L., Haliassos M. and T. Japelli eds, MIT Press.
Arrondel, L., 2002. ￿ Risk Management and Wealth Accumulation Behavior in France,￿Economics
Letters, vol. 74, pp. 187-194.
27Using a similarly elicited measure of earnings risk, Lusardi (1998) exploits the 1992 wave of the American HRS to
conclude that the e⁄ect of income uncertainty on the savings of the elderly is economically sizable, when it shouldn￿ t.
28Benzoni et al. (2007) develop a CRRA-Lognormal intertemporal portfolio choice model where labour income is
exogenous and uninsurable, but co-integrated with stock market returns. Because of the latter, they are able to show
that for reasonable degrees of relative risk aversion, young households opt to stay out from the stock market because
earnings and ￿nancial returns are strongly positively correlated. It is an open question whether occupational choice
would strenghten their insights.
11Arrondel L., H. Calvo Pardo and Oliver X., 2010. ￿ Temperance in Stock Market Participation:
Evidence from France,￿Economica, vol. 77, pp. 314-333.
Arrondel, L. and Masson, A., 2003. ￿ Stockholding in France,￿in Stockholding in Europe, Guiso
L., Haliassos M. and T. Jappelli eds, Palgrave, Hampshire.
Benzoni, L., P. Collin-Dufresne and R. S. Goldstein (2007), "Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle
when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated", Journal of Finance, Vol. LXII (5),
pp. 2123-67.
Barsky, R. B., Juster, T. F., Kimball, M. S. and Shapiro, M. D., 1997. ￿ Preference Parameters and
Behavioral Heterogeneity: an Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXII, pp. 537-580.
Campbell, J. Y. and Viceira, L. M., 2002. Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long
Term Investors, Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford University Press, New York.
Carroll, C. 1997. ￿ Bu⁄er-Stock Saving and the Life-Cycle Permanent Income Hypothesis,￿Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, pp. 1-55.
Chiappori, P.A. and Paiella, M., 2008. ￿Relative Risk Aversion is Constant: Evidence from Panel
Data,￿discussion paper No. 5/2008, Department of Economic Studies, University of Naples
"Parthenope".
Dominitz, J., 2001. ￿ Estimation of Income Expectations Models using Expectations and Realiza-
tions Data,￿Journal of Econometrics, vol. 102, pp. 165-195.
Dominitz, J. and Manski, C., 1997. ￿ Using Expectations Data to study Subjective Income Ex-
pectations,￿Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 92, pp. 855-867.
DrŁze, J. H. and Modigliani, F., 1972. ￿ Consumption under Uncertainty,￿Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 5, pp. 308-335.
DrŁze, J. H. and Modigliani, F., 1966. ￿ Epargne et consommation en avenir alØatoire,￿Cahiers
du SØminaire d￿ EconomØtrie, 9, pp. 7-33. (CORE reprint No. 9).
Eeckhoudt, L. and Schlesinger, H., 2006. ￿ Putting Risk in its Proper Place,￿American Economic
Review, vol. 96, pp. 280-289.
Elmendorf, D. W. and Kimball, M. S., 2000. ￿ Taxation of Labour Income and the Demand for
Risky Assets,￿International Economic Review, vol. 41, pp. 801-832.
Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln, N. and M. Sch￿ndeln, 2005. ￿ Precautionary Savings and Self-Selection: Evi-
dence from the German Reuni￿cation ￿ Experiment￿ ,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120,
vol. 3, pp. 1085-1120.
12Gollier, C., 2001. The Economics of Risk and Time, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Gollier, C. and J. Pratt, 1996. ￿ Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering E⁄ect of Background Risk,￿
Econometrica, vol. 64, pp. 1109-24.
Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., and Trognon, A., 1987. ￿ Simulated Residuals￿ , Journal of Econo-
metrics, vol. 34, pp. 201-252.
Guiso, L., Jappelli, T. and Terlizzese, D., 1996. ￿ Income Risk, Borrowing Constraints and Portfolio
Choice,￿American Economic Review, vol. 86, pp. 158-172.
Guiso L., T. Jappelli and M. Haliassos, 2003, Stockholding in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Hamp-
shire.
Haliassos, M. and Bertaut, C., 1995. ￿ Why Do So Few Hold Stocks?,￿ Economic Journal, vol.
105, pp. 1110-1129.
Kambourov, G., and Manovskii, I., 2009. ￿Occupational Speci￿city of Human Capital,￿Interna-
tional Economic Review, vol. 50 (1), pp. 63-115.
Kimball, M. S., 1993. ￿ Standard Risk Aversion,￿Econometrica, vol. 61, pp. 589-611.
Kimball, M. S., Sahm, C., and Shapiro, C., 2008. ￿ Imputing Risk Tolerance from Survey Re-
sponses,￿Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 103, pp. 1028-38.
Kimball, M. S., Sahm, C., and Shapiro, C., 2009. ￿ Risk Preferences in the PSID: Individual
Imputations and Family Covariation,￿American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
vol. 99, pp. 363-368.
King, M. A. and Leape, J. I., 1998. ￿ Wealth and Portfolio Composition: Theory and Evidence,￿
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 69, pp. 155-193.
Lusardi, A., 1997, ￿ Precautionary Saving and Subjective Earnings Variance,￿Economics Letters
57, pp. 319-326.
Lusardi, A., 1998, "On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive," American Economic
Review, vol. 88(2), pp. 449-453.
Massa, M. and Simonov, A., 2006. ￿ Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice,￿The Review of
Financial Studies, vol. 19, pp. 633-685.
Nielsen, H. S., and Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2006. ￿ The Impact of Labor Income Risk on Educa-
tional Choices: Estimates and Implied Risk Aversion,￿mimeo Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern University.
Palacios-Huerta, I., 2003. ￿ An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Properties of Human Capital
Returns,￿The American Economic Review, vol. 93, pp. 948-964.
13Sahm, C., 2007. ￿ How Much Does Risk Tolerance Change?￿ , Finance and Economic Discussion
Series 2007-66, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Saks, R. E. and Shore, S. H., 2005. ￿ Risk and Career Choice,￿Advances in Economic Analysis &
Policy, vol. 5(1), Article 7. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol5/iss1/art7
Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2002. ￿ Towards an explanation of Household Portfolio Choice Heterogene-
ity: Non￿nancial Income and Participation Cost Structures,￿N.B.E.R. WP8884.
Wooldridge, J. M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, the MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
14Appendix 1: Description of Main Variables
We mostly rely here on the ￿ Patrimoine 98￿household survey. A nationally representative sample of
more than 10,000 households was drawn and a comprehensive interview survey of their wealth was conducted
by French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE). Part of the questionnaire tries to give us a general idea
of individuals￿degree of exposure and aversion to risk, as subjectively perceived and assessed by them. It
consists of a recto-verso questionnaire, which was distributed to the interviewees at the end of the ￿rst
interview. This page submitted to the whole sample of 10,207 households must be ￿lled in individually by
the interviewee and his/her spouse (if applicable) and returned by post to the INSEE.
Total net wealth. In the survey, the individual is asked to say in which of the 9 prede￿ned available
brackets is her family. Since we are interested in a continuous measure we have used the method of simulated
residuals (GouriØroux et al., 1987). For each asset category, we have computed the value net of debt for each
household. We have then regressed the net worth of each asset on some household characteristics. Once
we have the estimated total net household wealth per asset category, a normally distributed error is added.
After that, we check if the value falls inside the bracket chosen by the individual. If not, another normal error
is added and so on until we predict the interval chosen. Doing so allows us to overcome the non-response
problem for some households. If there is a missing value, the predicted value plus a normal error is directly
used. Total net wealth is given in French francs.
Income. The survey directly asks each respondent to self-report income as a continuous variable. Income
refers to the household￿ s annual income in French francs.
Income risk. To construct a proxy for the subjective standard deviation of expected household income,
each household is asked to distribute 100 points between di⁄erent scenarios regarding the evolution of income
in the next ￿ve years. The procedure mimics the wording in the 1989 ￿Survey of Household Income and
Wealth ￿ (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy, successfully exploited by Guiso et al. (1996), and
subsequently loathed by Dominitz and Manski (1997) :
￿ Within the next 5 years, your household income (earnings, pension), excluding the rise in prices, will
have:
-... increased by more than 25%
-... increased by 10 to 25%
-... increased by less than 10%
-... will be constant
-... will have decreased by less than 10%
-... will have decreased by 10 to 25%
-... will have decreased by more than 25%
-... will have marked ups and downs (indicate the minimum and maximum annual income)
You dispose of 100 points to be distributed among the 8 items, according to the degree to which you
agree or you disagree with the relative statement.￿
The respondent is asked about the subjective relative likelihood
￿
pi
k
￿
of di⁄erent scenarios (k) regarding
the percentage change (y) in households￿ real income ￿ve years ahead from the time of the interview,
15y =
yt+5
yt ￿ 1 :
pi
k ￿ Pr i[y 2 fkg] = Pr i
￿
y
k ￿
yt+5
yt
￿ 1 ￿ yk
￿
Where for example, scenario k = 1 speci￿es a range of values in the support of the expected income percent
change y given by
￿
y
k;yk
￿
= (:25;+1): Combining the subjective relative likelihoods, with the median
points of the di⁄erent ranges (imposing a uniform within each subinterval), we can impute a subjective
variance (￿
2
y) for the expected ￿ve-year ahead percent change (Ey) in each respondent￿ s income,
￿2
y =
X
k
pi
k(medkfyg ￿ Ey)2:
Since the upper and lower subintervals are unbounded, we impose bounds of ￿:5 and ￿1; corresponding
to 50% and 100% changes respectively. Since y =
yt+5
yt ￿ 1, ￿2
y =
V ar(yt+5)
y2
t
￿ ￿2
y2: We assume that the
variance of household income can be proxied by the variance estimated by the respondent or, when there
were two respondents in the household, the variance evaluated by the head of the household.
(Table A1 about here)
Table A1 displays the frequency distribution of the ratio of the subjective standard deviation of expected
household real income to current income (￿=y). Two such measures are calculated depending on the values
adopted for the upper and lower bounds (respectively 50 and 100%). More than forty percent of those
surveyed hold point expectations about ￿ve-year-ahead real income changes. For almost half (46 percent)
of the respondents, the standard error is between 0 and 10 percent. Only ￿ve percent display a measure
of uncertainty exceeding 15 percent. For the whole sample, the mean of the standard error of earnings to
current income ratio is about 6.2 (resp. 14.9) percent.
Relative Risk Aversion. To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we asked individuals about their will-
ingness to gamble on lifetime income according to the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997). The ￿ game￿
resides in determining sequentially whether the interviewee would accept to give up his present income and
to accept other contracts, in the form of lotteries: he has one chance in two to double his income, and one
chance in two for it to be reduced by one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), and by one ￿fth
(contract C). More precisely, the question in the survey was:
￿ Suppose that you have a job which guarantees for life your household￿ s current income R. Other compa-
nies o⁄er you various contracts which have one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a higher income
and one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a lower income.
Are you prepared to accept Contract A which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances
that your income will be reduced by one third?
For those who answer YES : the Contract A is no longer available. You are o⁄ered Contract B instead
which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by one half. Are
you prepared to accept?
For those who answer NO : you have refused Contract A. You are o⁄ered Contract C. which has 50%
chances to double your income R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by 20%. Are you prepared to
accept?￿
16This allows us to obtain a range measure of relative risk aversion under the assumption that preferences
are strictly risk averse and utility is of the CRRA type. The degree of relative risk aversion is less than
1 if the individual successively accepts contracts A and B; between 1 and 2 if he accepts A but refuses B;
between 2 and 3.76 if he refuses A but accepts C; and ￿nally more than 3.76 if he refuses both A and C.
Among the 4,633 respondents to the questionnaire, 3,483 individuals participated in the lottery.
(Table A2 about here)
Table A2 reports the fraction of all respondents (￿rst line) and of those older than 50 (second line) who
fall into the four risk aversion categories. The results in the second line can be compared to those obtained
by Kimball et al. (2008) for the Health and Retirement Survey waves of 1992 (third line) and 1998 (fourth
line): most of the respondents in the U.S. are in the high risk aversion category (76% and 74%, respectively,
refuse contract A), very much as in France (85%). The main di⁄erence between the two countries resides
in the distribution between those who accept/reject contract C: In France, 43 percent of those who reject
contract A accept contract C, while in the U.S., only 15 percent accept job C (23% in 1998). Although in
France only 6 percent accept contract B, in the U.S. the acceptance rate ￿ uctuates from more than twice
in 1992 (12.8%) to a similar 7.3 percent in 1998. Kimball et al. (2008) argue that the discrepancy can be
explained by the status quo bias from which the wording of the question su⁄ered previous to the 1998 HRS
waves. Notice that the wording of the question in French places the respondent in a hypothetical (status
quo bias free) situation.
(Table A3 about here)
Table A3 reports the extent to which measured risk aversion predicts risky behaviour in di⁄erent settings,
in an attempt to partially validate it. Since the dependent variables are qualitative (except for income risk,
￿=y) we estimate some simple ordered probits (tobit) as a function of the categorical risk aversion variable,
and some covariates (constant, age, sex, education, occupational dummies, labor earnings, marital status,
number of children, past and current unemployment status, health status and a urban/rural categorical vari-
able). The estimation of the e⁄ect of risk aversion on income risk includes, in addition of the aforementioned
covariates for the household head, some characteristics related to the parents￿head background: social sta-
tus, a categorical variable taking value 1 if parents experienced ￿nancial di¢ culties during the respondent￿ s
youth and categorical variables for the composition of the parents￿portfolio. From the table, one can see
that measured risk aversion does strongly and signi￿cantly explain occupational risk exposure and ￿nancial
risk taking29, and to a lesser extent, horse race betting, and playing in the National lottery, slot machines
or in casinos.
Appendix 2: Proofs
Derivation of expressions (5) and (6): Earnings are endogenous but non-tradable.
29Financial risk taking is captured by a categorical variable with four outcomes, intended to capture the attitude
of the respondent towards the wishful balance between safe and risky assets when it comes to place her savings. The
wording of the question is (as a fraction of respondents):
Regarding ￿nancial investments, do you think that:
(a) one should not take risks; all of one￿ s savings should be invested in safe assets, (69.5%)
(b) a small share of one￿ s savings should be invested in riskier assets, (26.7%)
(c) a large share of one￿ s savings should be invested in risky assets if potential gains make it worthwile, (2.9%)
(d) the bulk of one￿ s savings should be invested in risky assets once there is a chance of very high potential gains
(0.9%)
17We fully describe Campbell and Viceira￿ s (2002) log-linear approximate solution method while deriving
DrŁze and Modigliani￿ s (1966) main result in a CRRA-Lognormal framework. We start from the household
budget constraint, (2), and substitute in household￿ s earnings (3):
e C(￿;￿) =
h
(1 + R) + ￿(e R ￿ R)
i
W0 + I + ￿(e I ￿ I):
Dividing the budget constraint by e Ye and taking logs yields
e c ￿ e ye = log[1 + expfe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg];
where expfe rpg ￿ (1 + e Rp): Taking a ￿rst order Taylor expansion of the log-budget constraint around
E fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg yields30:
log[1 + expfe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg] ’ log[1 + expE fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg]￿
￿
expEfe rp+w0￿e yeg
1+expEfe rp+w0￿e yegE fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg+
+
expE fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg
1 + expE fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg
| {z }
￿￿e<1
fe rp + w0 ￿ e yeg
And using the de￿nition of ￿; we can rewrite the ￿rst two terms on the RHS as log
h
1
1￿￿e
i
and ￿￿e log
h
￿e
1￿￿e
i
and de￿ne the constant ke ￿ log
h
1
1￿￿e
i
￿ ￿e log
h
￿e
1￿￿e
i
so that the log-budget constraint becomes:
e c = ke + ￿e fe rp + w0g + (1 ￿ ￿e)e ye
Rewriting the return of the portfolio as
1+e Rp
1+R = 1 + ￿
h
1+e R
1+R ￿ 1
i
and taking logs, yields
e rp ￿ r = log[1 + ￿(exp[e r ￿ r] ￿ 1)]:
Taking a second order Taylor expansion of the RHS around e r ￿ r = 0 :
log[1 + ￿(exp[e r ￿ r] ￿ 1)] ’ log[1 + ￿(exp[0] ￿ 1)] +
￿exp[0]
1+￿(exp[0]￿1) [e r ￿ r]+
+1
2
￿[1+￿(exp[0]￿1)]￿(￿exp[0])2
[1+￿(exp[0]￿1)]2 [e r ￿ r]
2
And the excess log portfolio return becomes e rp ￿ r = ￿[e r ￿ r] + 1
2￿(1 ￿ ￿)[e r ￿ r]
2 : The authors further
replace [e r ￿ r]
2 by its expectation E [e r ￿ r]
2 ￿ ￿2 so that,
e rp = r + ￿[e r ￿ r] +
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 (A.1)
Rewriting labour earnings as
e Ye
I = 1+￿
h
e I
I ￿ 1
i
and taking logs, yields e ye￿i = log
h
1 + ￿
￿
exp
h
e i ￿ i
i
￿ 1
￿i
:
30In the expression we keep the tildes above the random variables to clarify the exposition. Strictly speaking, the
Taylor expansion is done for all possible realizations of the random variables, so that the tildes do not appear.
18Taking a second order Taylor expansion of the RHS around e i ￿ i = 0 yields:
log
h
1 + ￿
￿
exp
h
e i ￿ i
i
￿ 1
￿i
’ log[1 + ￿ (exp[0] ￿ 1)] +
￿ exp[0]
1+￿(exp[0]￿1)
h
e i ￿ i
i
+
+1
2
￿[1+￿(exp[0]￿1)]￿(￿ exp[0])2
[1+￿(exp[0]￿1)]2
h
e i ￿ i
i2
Since the authors further replace
h
e i ￿ i
i2
by its expectation E
h
e i ￿ i
i2
￿ ￿2
i = ￿2
￿; household log income
becomes:
e ye = i + ￿
h
e i ￿ i
i
+
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
i (A.2)
Both expressions (A.1) and (A.2) hold exactly in continuous time. Replacing them in the log-budget
constraint yields:
e c = k + ￿e
￿
r + ￿[e r ￿ r] +
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + w0
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿e)
￿
i + ￿
h
e i ￿ i
i
+
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
i
￿
Now solving the program:
max
￿;￿
Eu
h
e C(￿;￿)
i
= max
￿;￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
E
h
e C(￿;￿)
i1￿￿
Yields the FOCs:
E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(e R ￿ R)W0
i
= 0
E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(e I ￿ I)
i
= 0
which are the standard Euler conditions. They can be rewritten as E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(1 + e R)
i
= E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(1 + R)
i
and E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(e I)
i
= E
h
e C(￿;￿)￿￿(I)
i
. Taking logs of both sides in both, and using the facts:
(i) e C; e I and (1 + e R) are jointly lognormally distributed, (ii) logEX = E logX + 1
2V logX and (iii)
X ￿ logN(E logX;V logX) =) Xt ￿ logN(tE logX;t2V logX) we obtain:
￿￿Ee c + Ee r + 1
2￿2￿2
c + 1
2￿2 ￿ ￿Cov(e c;e r) = ￿￿Ee c + r + 1
2￿2￿2
c
￿￿Ee c + Ee i + 1
2￿2￿2
c + 1
2￿2
i ￿ ￿Cov(e c;e i) = ￿￿Ee c + i + 1
2￿2￿2
c
Which simpli￿y to:
Ee r ￿ r + 1
2￿2 = ￿Cov(e c;e r)
Ee i ￿ i + 1
2￿2
i = ￿Cov(e c;e i)
And substituting in the approximated log-budget constraint derived above, yields:
Ee r ￿ r + 1
2￿2 = ￿￿e￿2￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿e)￿ir￿
Ee i ￿ i + 1
2￿2
i = ￿￿e￿ir￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿e)￿2
i￿
19And solving the system of equations in ￿ and ￿ yields:
￿DM = 1
￿e
h￿
1
1￿￿2
￿
Ee z
￿￿2
z ￿
￿
￿2
1￿￿2
￿
s
￿￿iz
i
￿DM = 1
1￿￿e
h￿
1
1￿￿2
￿
s
￿￿2
i
￿
￿
￿2
1￿￿2
￿
Ee z
￿￿iz
i
Where we have denoted Ee z ￿ Ee r ￿ r + ￿2
2 = log
E[1+e R]
[1+R] the log expected excess returns, ￿2
z ￿ ￿2 the
variance of the log excess returns and by ￿iz ￿ Cov(e i￿i;e r￿r) = Cov(e i;e r) = ￿ir the covariance between
log excess earnings and the log excess returns, so that ￿ = ￿iz
￿i￿z corresponds to the correlation coe¢ cient
between both. Finally, s ￿ Ee i ￿ i +
￿2
i
2 = log Ee I
I is the log expected excess earnings and ￿2
i(= ￿2
￿) the
variance of the log excess earnings.
Setting ￿ = 0; expressions (5) and (6) in the main text obtain.
Derivation of expressions (7) and (8): Earnings are endogenous and tradable.
It proceeds in the same way as above, except that the budget constraint is now:
e C(￿;￿) =
h
(1 + R) + ￿(e R ￿ R)
ih
W0 + I + ￿(e I ￿ I)
i
:
Dividing it by e Ycm; and taking logs on both sides, yields e c￿ e ycm = e rp +log[1 + expfw0 ￿ e ycmg]: Taking
a ￿rst order Taylor expansion of the log-budget constraint around E fw0 ￿ e ycmg:
log[1 + expfw0 ￿ e ycmg] ’ log[1 + expE fw0 ￿ e ycmg]￿
￿
expEfw0￿e ycmg
1+expEfw0￿e ycmgE fw0 ￿ e ycmg+
+
expE fw0 ￿ e ycmg
1 + expE fw0 ￿ e ycmg
| {z }
￿￿<1
fw0 ￿ e ycmg
And using the de￿nition of ￿; we can rewrite the ￿rst two terms on the RHS as log
h
1
1￿￿
i
and ￿￿log
h
￿
1￿￿
i
and de￿ne the constant k ￿ log
h
1
1￿￿
i
￿ ￿log
h
￿
1￿￿
i
so that the log-budget constraint becomes:
e c = k + e rp + ￿w0 + (1 ￿ ￿)e ycm
Since expressions (A.1) and (A.2) remain the same, we can insert them in the log-budget constraint:
e c = k + r + ￿[e r ￿ r] +
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 + ￿w0 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
i + ￿
h
e i ￿ i
i
+
1
2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
i
￿
which substituted into the unchanged above log-Euler equations, yields:
Ee r ￿ r + 1
2￿2 = ￿￿2￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ir￿
Ee i ￿ i + 1
2￿2
i = ￿￿ir￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
i￿
20And solving the system of equations in ￿ and ￿ yields:
￿￿ =
h￿
1
1￿￿2
￿
Ee z
￿￿2
z ￿
￿
￿2
1￿￿2
￿
s
￿￿iz
i
￿￿ = 1
1￿￿
h￿
1
1￿￿2
￿
s
￿￿2
i
￿
￿
￿2
1￿￿2
￿
Ee z
￿￿iz
i
If portfolio returns and earnings are independent, ￿ = 0; and expressions (7) and (8) obtain.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof proceeds in two steps: (1.i) we obtain the exact moments of the distribution of endogenous
earnings e Ye; instead of using its log-linearized ￿rst order Taylor expansion (A.2), and (1.ii) we compute the
derivative d￿DM
d￿DM using the chain rule of di⁄erentiation:
(1.i) Moments of the distribution of earnings e Ye
Here we show that e Ye ￿ LN(￿y;￿2
y) with ￿y ￿ E ln e Ye; ￿2
y ￿ V arln e Ye:
Consider the expressions for labour earnings, (3), and for earnings in the risky occupation, (4). From
the latter, we have that:
ln e I = lnI + s + e ￿ =) ln e I ￿ N(￿i;￿2
i) :
￿i = lnI + s ￿
1
2
￿2
￿;￿2
i = ￿2
￿
Hence:
e I ￿ LN(￿i;￿2
i)
implying that:
￿e I ￿ LN(￿i + ln￿;￿2
i) (13)
and from the properties of lognormally distributed variables, we have that (1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿e I = e Ye is going to
be distributed as a shifted lognormal, with location parameter (1 ￿ ￿)I :
e Ye = (1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿e I ￿ LN(￿y;￿2
y)
Finally, we ￿nd out ￿y and ￿2
y using the conditions:
Ee Ye = (1 ￿ ￿)I + E(￿e I) (14)
V are Ye = V ar(￿e I) (15)
From (13), we have that the RHS of (14) and (15) equal respectively:
(1 ￿ ￿)I + E(￿e I) = (1 ￿ ￿)I + exp
￿
￿i + ln￿ +
1
2
￿2
i
￿
(16)
V ar(￿e I) = ￿2 exp
￿
2￿i + ￿2
i
￿￿
exp
￿
￿2
i
￿
￿ 1
￿
(17)
21whereas from e Ye ￿ LN(￿y;￿2
y); the LHS of (14) and (15) equal respectively:
Ee Ye = exp
￿
￿y +
1
2
￿2
y
￿
(18)
V are Ye = exp
￿
2￿y + ￿2
y
￿￿
exp
￿
￿2
y
￿
￿ 1
￿
(19)
Inserting these expressions into the LHS and the RHS of (14) and (15), we obtain:
￿y = ln
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)I + exp
￿
￿i + ln￿ +
1
2
￿2
i
￿￿
￿
1
2
￿2
y
￿2
y = ln
"
1 +
exp
￿
2(￿i + ln￿) + ￿2
i
￿￿
exp
￿
￿2
i
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)I + exp
￿
￿i + ln￿ + 1
2￿2
i
￿￿2
#
further substitution of the expression for ￿2
y above into ￿y; as well as the expressions for ￿i and ￿2
i into
both, yields:
￿y = ln
2
6
4
[(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿I expfsg]
2
h
(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿I expfsg + (￿I)
2 expf2sg[expf￿2
￿g ￿ 1]
i 1
2
3
7
5
￿2
y = ln
"
1 +
(￿I)
2 expf2sg
￿
exp
￿
￿2
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿I expfsg]
2
#
Notice that
d￿2
y
d￿ =
2￿I3 expf2sg[expf￿2
￿g￿1]
expf￿2
yg[(1￿￿)I+￿I expfsg]3 > 0:
(1.ii) Computing the derivative d￿DM
d￿DM using the chain rule of di⁄erentiation:
d￿DM
d￿DM
=
d￿DM
d￿e
d￿e
d￿DM
=
d￿DM
d￿e
￿
@￿e
@Ee ye
dEe ye
d￿DM
￿
;8(￿;￿) 2 (0;1)2
where d￿DM
d￿e = ￿￿DM
￿e < 0; @￿e
@Ee ye = ￿(1 ￿ ￿e) < 0 and, after tedious algebraic computations:
dEe ye
d￿DM =
3[(1￿￿)I+￿I expfsg]I(expfsg￿1)+[￿I(expfsg￿1)￿1]2￿I2 expf2sg[expf￿2
￿g￿1]
2[(1￿￿)I+￿I expfsg][(1￿￿)I+￿I expfsg+(￿I)2 expf2sg[expf￿2
￿g￿1]] > 0
if I > 1
￿(expfsg￿1); a merely technical restriction.31 Hence d￿DM
d￿DM > 0.
31For realistic values of I and s, only when ￿ ! 0
+ will the condition be violated. But, under the condition that
s > 0, ￿ 2 (0;1) because risk aversion only has a second order e⁄ect under CRRA preferences (as in the classic Arrow
portfolio choice problem).
22Table 1. Sample Characteristics: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey
Average household's characteristics Respondents Total sample
Total net wealth (mean in French francs) 749,000 701,500
Financial wealth (mean in French francs) 245,000 220,000
Household income (mean in French francs) 156,750 152,800
Direct stockholdings
(1):
Mean share (% of financial wealth) 19.0 21.0
In total sample (% of households) 20.5 15.0
Direct and indirect stockholdings
(2):
Mean share (% of financial wealth) 27.0 27.8
In total sample (% of households) 30.0 23.1
Age of head (% of households)
less than 30 years old 11.5 11.8
30-40 years old 17.3 19.1
40-50 years old 18.8 20.3
50-60 years old 16.1 15.9
60-70 years old 15.3 13.4
more than 70 years old 21.1 19.5
Social status of head (% of households)
Farmer 4.6 5.1
Self employed (small production unit) 7.0 8.3
Self employed (big production unit) 0.2 0.4
Liberal profession 1.1 1.1
Executive 13.8 11.8
High qualified employee 21.8 18.8
Low qualified employee 20.0 19.4
High qualified workers 18.6 20.9
Low qualified workers 9.9 11.6
Inactive 2.8 2.7
Education of the head (% of households)
No diploma 16.7 20.8
Primary school 33.4 33.7
High school 14.7 14.5
Some college 14.2 13.0
College 12.7 11.3
More than college 8.3 6.7
Household composition (% of households)
Single 32.6 30.0
Couple without children 28.7 26.0
Couple with one child 12.0 13.3
Couple with two children 11.6 13.2
Couple with three children or more 5.3 6.9
Single with children 5.9 6.4
Other cases 3.8 4.2
Urban resident (%) 56.1 59.5
Probability of liquidity constraints (% of  households) 11.7 9.8
Relative risk aversion (CRRA)
(3)(4)
3.76 ≤ CRRA 41.3
2≤CRRA<3.76 40.2
1≤CRRA<2 11.9
CRRA < 1 6.5
Coefficient of variation of earnings
(4)(5) 6.2-14.9
Number of households 2,954 10,207
Source: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey
(1) Direct stockholding : the household holds equities directly
(3) The coefficient of relative risk aversion constructed as in Barskyet al. (1997).
(4) Household's characteristicsrefer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables,when there were
two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the head of the household. 
(5) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, the two reported values for mean
income risk are computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 50% of real income increases, and 100% respectively.
(2) Direct and indirect stockholding : the household holds equities either directly or through mutual fundsTable 2a. The demand for risky assets* 
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 4.017 (0.409) 1.401 (1.500) 1.052 (0.116) 4.929 (0.409) -0.184 (1.599) 1.329 (0.124)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -2.003 (0.295) -0.070 (0.817) -0.487 (0.082) -2.618 (0.288) 0.926 (0.927) -0.634 (0.090)
Income (log.) 0.120 (0.066) -0.159 (0.155) 0.026 (0.018) 0.048 (0.058) -0.089 (0.138) 0.008 (0.018)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E 0.418 (0.247) -0.315 (0.513) 0.102 (0.070) 0.556 (0.242) -0.700 (0.484) 0.125 (0.074)
Age(10E-1) 0.233 (0.151) -0.447 (0.352) 0.057 (0.044) 0.277 (0.141) 0.040 (0.323) 0.109 (0.045)
Age squared (10E-2) -0.018 (0.014) 0.049 (0.033) -0.004 (0.004) -0.020 (0.013) 0.008 (0.030) -0.007 (0.004)
Education
Primary school 0.145 (0.125) 0.029 (0.037) 0.104 (0.115) 0.019 (0.037)
High school 0.239 (0.143) 0.069 (0.042) 0.403 (0.130) 0.131 (0.042)
Some college 0.348 (0.139) 0.099 (0.040) 0.425 (0.129) 0.143 (0.041)
College 0.428 (0.148) 0.115 (0.043) 0.445 (0.138) 0.153 (0.044)
More than college 0.460 (0.154) 0.114 (0.044) 0.496 (0.146) 0.154 (0.046)
Parents own risky assets 0.413 (0.088) 0.108 (0.025) 0.328 (0.087) 0.094 (0.027)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -1.765 (0.597) 0.762 (1.800) -0.513 (0.173) -2.337 (0.558) 3.044 (1.832) -0.707 (0.180)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0.236 (0.104) 0.276 (0.249) 0.064 (0.030) 0.165 (0.098) 0.157 (0.225) 0.052 (0.031)
2≤CRRA<3.76 0.238 (0.078) 0.260 (0.193) 0.075 (0.023) 0.185 (0.074) 0.005 (0.174) 0.056 (0.024)
1≤CRRA<2 0.177 (0.116) 0.434 (0.271) 0.071 (0.033) 0.150 (0.110) 0.407 (0.247) 0.073 (0.035)
CRRA<1 0.284 (0.146) 0.183 (0.339) 0.088 (0.042) 0.273 (0.140) 0.364 (0.306) 0.104 (0.044)
Constant -3.712 (0.787) 0.069 (2.321) -0.951 (0.225) -2.825 (0.696) -0.861 (2.116) -0.887 (0.221)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.173 (0.449) -0.457 (0.456)
χ²(17) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey.
Direct and indirect stockholding Direct stockholding
2,384 2,384
(6) Tobit
(1)
381.58
(5) Demand equation
(1) (4) Probit (3) Tobit
(1) (1) Probit
(2) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, income risk is computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 50% of real income increases.
0.219
* Households'characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, when there were two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the
head of the household. Reference groups are: no diploma, single, CRRA  ≥ 3.76, no specific management.
467 617
(1) The dependent variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth: log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependentvariable is the
share of risky assets in financial wealth.
2,384
(2) Demand equation
(1)
0.208 278.38
2,384Table 2b. The demand for risky assets* 
Variables
Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.) Est. (s.e.)
Total net wealth (10E-7) 4.026 (0.409) 1.428 (1.503) 1.053 (0.116) 4.935 (0.409) -0.142 (1.596) 1.329 (0.123)
Total net wealth squared (10E-14) -1.977 (0.294) -0.114 (0.811) -0.481 (0.082) -2.583 (0.287) 0.844 (0.916) -0.625 (0.090)
Income (log.) 0.132 (0.065) -0.184 (0.155) 0.027 (0.018) 0.058 (0.057) -0.120 (0.136) 0.009 (0.018)
Income risk (standard error of future income*10E 0.111 (0.078) 0.051 (0.159) 0.034 (0.022) 0.177 (0.078) -0.124 (0.150) 0.045 (0.024)
Age(10E-1) 0.234 (0.152) -0.450 (0.352) 0.059 (0.044) 0.283 (0.141) 0.045 (0.324) 0.111 (0.045)
Age squared (10E-2) -0.019 (0.014) 0.050 (0.033) -0.004 (0.004) -0.020 (0.013) 0.008 (0.030) -0.008 (0.004)
Education
Primary school 0.142 (0.125) 0.029 (0.037) 0.101 (0.115) 0.018 (0.037)
High school 0.235 (0.143) 0.068 (0.042) 0.400 (0.130) 0.131 (0.042)
Some college 0.346 (0.139) 0.099 (0.040) 0.425 (0.129) 0.143 (0.041)
College 0.426 (0.147) 0.115 (0.043) 0.443 (0.138) 0.152 (0.044)
More than college 0.466 (0.154) 0.116 (0.044) 0.504 (0.146) 0.156 (0.046)
Parents own risky assets 0.412 (0.088) 0.108 (0.025) 0.328 (0.087) 0.094 (0.027)
Proxy for liquidity constraints -1.772 (0.598) 0.742 (1.802) -0.515 (0.173) -2.352 (0.559) 3.004 (1.833) -0.710 (0.180)
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
No answer 0.235 (0.104) 0.277 (0.249) 0.064 (0.030) 0.163 (0.098) 0.158 (0.225) 0.052 (0.031)
2≤CRRA<3.76 0.242 (0.078) 0.255 (0.194) 0.076 (0.023) 0.189 (0.074) -0.004 (0.174) 0.057 (0.024)
1≤CRRA<2 0.181 (0.115) 0.418 (0.272) 0.071 (0.033) 0.151 (0.110) 0.391 (0.247) 0.072 (0.035)
CRRA<1 0.287 (0.146) 0.146 (0.338) 0.088 (0.042) 0.273 (0.140) 0.347 (0.306) 0.104 (0.044)
Constant -3.834 (0.780) 0.293 (2.327) -0.970 (0.223) -2.934 (0.695) -0.598 (2.118) -0.904 (0.220)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.192 (0.448) -0.429 (0.454)
χ²(54) or Pseudo R2 
Number of observations
Source: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey.
Direct and indirect stockholding Direct stockholding
(3) Tobit
(1) (1) Probit (2) Demand equation
(1) (6) Tobit
(1)
(1) The dependent variable in demand equation (2) is the logistic transformation of the share (p) of risky assets in financial wealth: log p/(1-p). In Tobit estimation (3), the dependent variable is the
share of risky assets in financial wealth.
(4) Probit (5) Demand equation
(1)
0.208 277.04
(2) Since five year ahead real income increases were unbounded above and below in the questionnaire, income risk is computed imposing lower and upper bounds of 100% of real income increases.
* Households' characteristics refer to the head except for income risk and relative risk aversion. For these two variables, when there were two respondents, we imputed the one corresponding to the
head of the household. Reference groups are: no diploma, single, CRRA  ≥ 3.76, no specific management.
380.17 0.220
2,384 617 2,384 467 2,384 2,384Table 3. Specification tests
Test   Test Statistic p-value  Conclusion
Instruments correlated with endogenous variable F = 19,12 <0,0001 Good instruments
Probability of direct stockholding ownership
1
Endogeneity  χ
2(1) = 0,5782 0.447 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F(4,2326)=0,60 0.660 Good instruments
Probability of direct or indirect  stockholding ownership
1
Endogeneity  χ
2(1) = 1,20 0.273 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F(4,2326) = 1,28 0.275 Good instruments
Share of direct stockholding in financial wealth
2
Endogeneity  χ
2(1) = 3,51 0.086 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F(5,464) = 0,37 0.869 Good instruments
Share of direct or indirect stockholding in financial wealth
2
Endogeneity  χ
2(1) = 0,049 0.945 Not endogenous
Validity of instruments F(5,617) = 0,61 0.694 Good instruments
Source: "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey
(2) Given that the earnings variance is exogenous in the participation equation, the conditional demand is estimated following a two-
step approach (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 567). In the first stage we estimate the inverse Mills ratio from a probit of the discrete choice
variable on the exogenous variables and the set of instruments. The second step estimates by 2SLS the conditional asset demand
including the estimated inverse Mills ratio both in the set of regressors and in the set of instruments. The null hypothesis of
exogeneity is tested using the usual t-statistic on the second stage estimated coefficient for the predicted errors of the first stage
regression (reported as a chi-square statistic). To test whether instruments are exogenous, we regress the 2SLS predicted errors on
the set of instruments (including the inverse Mills ratio).  
(1) The probability is estimated by a two-step approach (Wooldridge, 2002, p.473), where the first stage is a linear projection of the
earnings variance on the instrument set, while the second is a Probit that includes the predicted errors of the first stage regression.
The chi-square statistic reported is actually the (t-statistic)² of the coefficient estimate of the predicted errors. To test for the
exogeneity of the instruments, we regress the Probit predicted residuals on the set of instruments.σ/y    (%)
Number of 
observations in 
the sample
(1)
Frequency 
(%)
(1)
0 977 41.0
0-2.5 145 6.1
2.5-5.0 320 12.7
4.0-7.5 406 14.9
7.5-10.0 232 5.9
10.0-15 182 11.7
more than 15 122 7.8
Mean : 6.2
(1)-14.9
(2) 2,384 100.0
Source : "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey
(1) The lower and the upper bound are equal to 50%.
(2) The lower and the upper bound are equal to 100%.
Rejection of 
contract C
Acceptance of 
contract C
Rejection of 
contract B
3.76≤γ 2≤γ<3.76 1≤γ<2
France (total sample) 43.1 39.4 11.2
France (≥ 50 years 
old)
48.6 36.8 8.7
U.S.A. (≥ 50 years 
old)
64.6 11.6 10.9
Source : "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey, Health and Retirement Survey (cf. Barsky  et al. 1997)
Table A1 : Frequency Distribution of the Subjective 
Standard Deviation to Current Earnings' Ratio (σ/y)
5.9
12.8
Table A2 : Risk aversion in France and in the U.S.
Rejection of Contract A 
γ<1
Acceptance of Contract A
Acceptance of 
contract B
6.3CRRA value
Regression coefficient 
of risk aversion (SE)
No answer -0,012 (0,005)
γ>3,76  
2≤γ<3.76 0,015 (0,004)
1≤γ<2 0,019 (0,006)
γ<1 0,021 (0,007)
No answer 0,413 (0,123)
γ>3,76  
2≤γ<3.76 0,990 (0,093)
1≤γ<2 0,987 (0,135)
γ<1 1,557 (0,170)
No answer 0,299 (0,147)
γ>3,76
2≤γ<3.76 0,325 (0,125)
1≤γ<2 0,129 (0,196)
γ<1 0,324 (0,228)
No answer 0,119 (0,090)
γ>3,76
2≤γ<3.76 0,347 (0,075)
1≤γ<2 0,224 (0,114)
γ<1 0,440 (0,151)
No answer 0,014 (0,170)
γ>3,76
2≤γ<3.76 0,466 (0,137)
1≤γ<2 0,415 (0,198)
γ<1 0,360 (0,260)
No answer 0,061 (0,298)
γ>3,76
2≤γ<3.76 0,446 (0,239)
1≤γ<2 0,629 (0,312)
γ<1 0,979 (0,359)
Source : "Patrimoine 98" INSEE survey
(1) Regarding financial investments, do you think that (as a fraction of respondents):  
 -one should not take risks ; all of one’s savings should be invested in safe assets (69.5%
 -a small share of one’s savings should be invested in riskier assets (26.7%)
 -a large share of one’s savings should be invested in risky assets if potential gains make it worthwhile (2.9%
 -the bulk of one’s savings should be invested in risky assets once there is a chance of very high potential gains (0.9%
Horses race bets 0.07
National lotteries 0.05
0.11
Table A3 : Does Measured Risk Aversion Predict Behavior? Regressing Behavior 
on Risk Aversion and Demographic Variables
Financial attitudes
 (1) 
Pseudo R2 Dependent variable
Income risk (σ/y) 0.22
The dependent variables are qualitative exceptforincome risk. Thereare four categoriesfor "financialattitudes" (cf.infra ),
three (yes several times a year, yes but rarely, no) for "horses race bets" (5.6%; 8.1%; 86.3%) and "national lotteries"
(23.3%; 29.2%; 47.6%) and two (yes or no) for "slot machines" (8.7%; 91.3%) and "casino"(2.9%; 97.1%). The estimated
qualitative regressions include the following covariates the coefficients of which are not reported : constant, age, sex,
occupational dummies, labor income, marital status, number of children, unemployement dummies (past, actual), health
problem dummies, urban/rural dummies and education (years). The tobit model of (σ/y) includes the same covariates for
the household's head, and some characteristics of the parents' head : social status, dummies for financial difficultiesduring
respondent's youth and portfolio composition dummies
Slot machines 0.09
Casino 0.12